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Abstract
In Newcomb’s paradox you choose to receive either the contents of a
particular closed box, or the contents of both that closed box and another
one. Before you choose, a prediction algorithm deduces your choice, and
fills the two boxes based on that deduction. Newcomb’s paradox is that
game theory appears to provide two conflicting recommendations for what
choice you should make in this scenario. We analyze Newcomb’s paradox
using a recent extension of game theory in which the players set conditional
probability distributions in a Bayes net. We show that the two game the-
ory recommendations in Newcomb’s scenario have different presumptions
for what Bayes net relates your choice and the algorithm’s prediction. We
resolve the paradox by proving that these two Bayes nets are incompatible.
We also show that the accuracy of the algorithm’s prediction, the focus of
much previous work, is irrelevant. In addition we show that Newcomb’s
scenario only provides a contradiction between game theory’s expected util-
ity and dominance principles if one is sloppy in specifying the underlying
Bayes net. We also show that Newcomb’s paradox is time-reversal invariant;
both the paradox and its resolution are unchanged if the algorithm makes its
‘prediction’ after you make your choice rather than before.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Suppose you meet a Wise being (W) who tells you it has put $1,000 in box A,
and either $1 million or nothing in box B. This being tells you to either take
the contents of box B only, or to take the contents of both A and B. Suppose
further that the being had put the $1 million in box B only if a prediction algorithm
designed by the being had said that you would take only B. If the algorithm had
predicted you would take both boxes, then the being put nothing in box B.
Presume that due to determinism, there exists a perfectly accurate prediction
algorithm. Assume that W uses that algorithm to make its prediction, and after
that you make your choice. However when you make your choice, you don’t
know what that prediction is. What choice should you make?
In Table 1 we present this question as a game theory matrix involving W’s
prediction and your choice. Two seemingly logical answers contradict each other.
The Realist answer is that you should take both boxes, because your choice occurs
after W has already made its prediction, and since you have free will, you’re free
to make whatever choice you want, independent of that prediction that W made.
More precisely, if W predicted you would take A along with B, then taking both
gives you $1,000 rather than nothing. If instead W predicted you would take only
B, then taking both boxes yields $1,001,000, which again is $1000 better than
taking only B. (In the language of game theory, choosing both A and B is the
dominant strategy [1, 2, 3].) In contrast, the Fearful answer is that W designed
a prediction algorithm whose answer will match what you do. So you can get
$1,000 by taking both boxes or get $1 million by taking only box B. Therefore
you should take only B.
This is the conventional formulation of Newcomb’s Paradox, a famous logical
riddle stated by William Newcomb in 1960 [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14].
Newcomb never published the paradox, but had long conversations about it with
with philosophers and physicists such as Robert Nozick and Martin Kruskal, along
with Scientific American’s Martin Gardner. Gardner said after his second Scien-
tific American column on Newcomb’s paradox appeared that it generated more
mail than any other column.
One of us (Benford) worked with Newcomb, publishing several papers to-
gether. We often discussed the paradox, which Newcomb invented to test his own
ideas. Newcomb said that he would just take B; why fight a God-like being?
However Nozick said, “To almost everyone, it is perfectly clear and obvious what
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should be done. The difficulty is that these people seem to divide almost evenly
on the problem, with large numbers thinking that the opposing half is just being
silly” [4].
Nozick also pointed out that two accepted principles of game theory appear to
conflict in Newcomb’s problem. The expected-utility principle, considering the
probability of each outcome, says you should take box B only. But the dominance
principle argues that if one strategy is always better than the other strategies no
matter what other players do, then you should pick that strategy. No matter what
box B contains, you are $1000 richer if you take both boxes than if you take B
only. So the dominance principle says you should take both boxes.
Is there really a contradiction? Some philosophers argue that a perfect predic-
tor implies a time machine, since with such a machine causality is reversed, i.e.,
for predictions made in the present to be perfectly determined by events in the
future means that the future causes past events.1
But Nozick stated the problem specifically to exclude backward causation (and
so time travel), because his formulation demands only that the predictions be of
high accuracy, not certain. So this line of reasoning cannot resolve the issue.
1.2 Game theory over Bayes nets
Central to Newcomb’s scenario is a prediction process, and its (in)fallibility. Re-
cent work has revealed deep formal connections between prediction and observa-
tion. Amongst other things, this work proves that any given prediction algorithm
must fail on at least one prediction task [16, 17]. That particular result does not
resolve Newcomb’s paradox. However the proof of that result requires an exten-
sion of conventional game theory. And as we show below, that extension of game
theory provides a way to resolve Newcomb’s paradox.
In conventional game theory there are several ‘players’, each with their own
preferences over the values of an underlying set of game variables, {X j}. Every
player has their own strategy set, where each strategy is itself a set, of condi-
tional probability distributions relating some of the game variables {X j}. To play
the game, the players all independently choose a strategy (i.e., choose a set of
distributions) from their respective strategy sets. The strategies sets are carefully
designed so that every such joint strategy of the players uniquely specifies a legal
1Interestingly, near when Newcomb devised the paradox, he also coauthored a paper prov-
ing that a tachyonic time machine could not be reinterpreted in a way that precludes such para-
doxes [15]. The issues of time travel and Newcomb-style paradoxes are intertwined.
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joint probability distribution relating all the game’s variables [1, 2, 3].
A richer mathematics arises if we expand the strategy sets of the players, so
that some joint strategies would violate the laws of probability, and therefore are
impossible. Formally, in this extension of conventional game theory, multiple
different Bayes nets relating the game variables are specified, and each player sets
conditional distributions at some nodes in each of those Bayes nets. So a player’s
strategy now specifies conditional distributions in all of the Bayes nets at once.
(In contrast, conventional game theory implicitly only allows a single Bayes net.)
This means that some joint player strategies may be impossible, in that they result
in each Bayes net having a different joint distribution over the game variables.
Whenever the joint distributions of two Bayes nets are inconsistent this way, some
set of the conditional distributions in one of the two nets will conflict with some
set of distributions in the other Bayes net.
It is exactly such inconsistent joint distributions that underlie the fallibility
of prediction proven in [16, 17]. As we show below, this possibility of incon-
sistency also arises when one properly formalizes Newcomb’s scenario in terms
of games. In turn, this possibility of inconsistency resolves Newcomb’s paradox.
Loosely speaking, Newcomb’s scenario involves two Bayes nets, one correspond-
ing to Realist’s reasoning, and one corresponding to Fearful’s reasoning. One can
choose one Bayes net or the other, but to avoid inconsistency, one cannot choose
both. In short, Realist and Fearful implicitly formalize Newcomb’s scenario in
different, and incompatible ways.
In the next section, we first show how to express the reasoning of Realist and
of Fearful in terms of strategy spaces over two different Bayes nets. We then
show that those two Bayes nets and associated strategy spaces cannot be com-
bined without raising the possibility of inconsistent joint distributions between
the Bayes nets. This resolves Newcomb’s paradox, without relying on mathema-
tizations of concepts that are vague and/or controversial (e.g., ‘free will’, ’causal-
ity’). In addition, our resolution shows that there is no conflict in Newcomb’s
scenario between the dominance principle of game theory and the expected utility
principle. Once one takes care to specify the underlying Bayes net game, those
principles are completely consistent with one another.
We end by discussing the implications of our analysis. In particular, our anal-
ysis formally establishes the (un)importance of W’s predictive accuracy. It also
provides an illustrative way to look at Newcomb’s scenario by running that sce-
nario backwards in time.
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2 Resolving Newcomb’s paradox with extended game
theory
There are two players in Newcomb’s paradox: you, and the wise being W. In
addition, there are two game variables that are central to the paradox: W’s predic-
tion, g, and the choice you actually make, y. So the player strategies will involve
the joint probability distribution relating those two variables. Since there are only
two variables, there are only two ways to decompose that joint probability distri-
bution into a Bayes net. These two decompositions turn out to correspond to the
two recommendations for how to answer Newcomb’s question, one matching the
reasoning of Realist and one matching Fearful.
2.1 The first decomposition of the joint probability
The first way to decompose the joint probability is
P(y, g) = P(g | y)P(y) (1)
(where we define the right-hand side to equal 0 for any y such that P(y) = 0).
Such a decomposition is known as a ‘Bayes net’ having two ‘nodes’ [18, 19]. The
variable y, and the associated unconditioned distribution, P(y), is identified with
the first, ‘parent’ node. The variable g, and the associated conditional distribution,
P(g | y), is identified with the second, ‘child’ node. The stochastic dependence
of g on y can be graphically illustrated by having a directed edge go from a node
labeled y to a node labeled g.
This Bayes net can be used to express Fearful’s reasoning. Fearful interprets
the statement that ‘W designed a perfectly accurate prediction algorithm’ to imply
that W has the power to set the conditional distribution in the child node of the
Bayes net, P(g | y), to anything it wants (for all y such that P(y) , 0). More
precisely, since the algorithm is ‘perfectly accurate’, Fearful presumes that W
chooses to set P(g | y) = δg,y, the Kronecker delta function that equals 1 if g = y,
zero otherwise. So Fearful presumes that there is nothing you can do that can
affect the values of P(g | y) (for all y such that P(y) , 0). Instead, you get to
choose the unconditioned distribution in the parent node of the Bayes net, P(y).
Intuitively, this choice constitutes your ‘free will’.
Fearful’s interpretation of Newcomb’s paradox specifies what aspect of P(y, g)
you can choose, and what aspect is instead chosen by W. Those choices — P(y)
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and P(g | y), respectively — are the ‘strategies’ that you and W choose. It is im-
portant to note that these strategies by you and W do not directly specify the two
variables y and g. Rather the strategies you and W choose specify two different
distributions which, taken together, specify the full joint distribution over y and
g [19]. This kind of strategy contrasts with the kind considered in decision the-
ory [20] or causal nets [18], where the strategies are direct specifications of the
variables (which here are g and y).
In game theory, by the axioms of VonNeumann Morgenstern utility theory,
your task is to choose the strategy that maximizes your expected payoff under
the associated joint distribution.2 For Fearful, this means choosing the P(y) that
maximizes your expected payoff under the P(y, g) associated with that choice.
Given Fearful’s presumption that the Bayes net of Eq. 1 underlies the game with
P(g | y) = δg,y, and that your strategy is to set the distribution at the first node,
for you to maximize expected payoff your strategy should be P(y) = δy,B. In other
words, you should choose B with probability 1. Your doing so results in the joint
distribution P(y, g) = δg,yδy,B = δg,Bδy,B, with payoff 1, 000, 000. This is the
formal justification of Fearful’s recommendation.3
2.2 The second decomposition of the joint probability
The second way to decompose the joint probability is
P(y, g) = P(y | g)P(g) (2)
(where we define the right-hand side to equal 0 for any g such that P(g) = 0). In
the Bayes net of Eq. 2, the unconditioned distribution identified with the parent
node is P(g), and the conditioned distribution identified with the child node is P(y |
g). This Bayes net can be used to express Realist’s reasoning. Realist interprets
the statements that ‘your choice occurs after W has already made its prediction’
and ‘when you have to make your choice, you don’t know what that prediction is’
to mean that you can choose any distribution h(y) and then set P(y | g) to equal
2For simplicity, we make the common assumption that utility is a linear function of payoff [21].
So maximizing expected utility is the same as maximizing expected payoff.
3In Fearful’s Bayes net, y ‘causally influences g’, to use the language of causal nets [18].
To cast this kind of causal relationship in terms of conventional game theory, we would have to
replace the single-stage game in Table 1 with a two-stage game in which you first set y, and then W
strategies, having observed y. This two-stage game is incompatible with Newcomb’s stipulation
that W strategies before you do, not after. This is one of the reasons why it is necessary to use
extended game theory rather than conventional game theory to formalize Fearful’s reasoning.
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h(y) (for all g such that P(g) , 0). This is how Realist interprets your having
‘free will’. (Note that this is a different interpretation of ‘free will” from the one
made by Fearful.) Under this interpretation, W has no power to affect P(y | g).
Rather W gets to set the parent node in the Bayes net, P(g). For Realist, this is the
distribution that you cannot affect. (In contrast, in Fearful’s reasoning, you set a
non-conditional distribution, and it is the conditional distribution that you cannot
affect.)
Realist’s interpretation of Newcomb’s paradox specifies what it is you can set
concerning P(y, g), and what is set by W. Just like under Fearful’s reasoning, under
Realist’s reasoning the ‘strategies’ you and W choose do not directly specify the
variables g and y. Rather the strategies of you and W specify two distributions
which, taken together, specify the full joint distribution. As before, your task
is to choose your strategy — which now is h(y) — to maximize your expected
payoff under the associated P(y, g). Given Realist’s presumption that the Bayes
net of Eq. 2 underlies the game and that you get to set h, you should choose
h(y) = P(y | g) = δy,AB, i.e., you should choose AB with probability 1. Doing this
results in the expected payoff 1, 000 P(g = AB) + 1, 001, 000 P(g = B), which
is your maximum expected payoff no matter what the values of P(g = AB) and
P(g = B) are. This is the formal justification of Realist’s recommendation.
Note that in Fearful’s interpretation, your strategy is choosing a single real
number, while W chooses two real numbers. In contrast, in Realist’s interpreta-
tion, your strategy is still to choose a single real number, but now W also chooses
only a single real number. The different interpretations correspond to different
games.4
2.3 Combining the decompositions
The original statement of Newcomb’s question is somewhat informal. In partic-
ular, as originally stated, and as commonly analyzed, Newcomb’s question does
not specify whether you are playing the game that Feaful thinks is being played,
or the game that Realist thinks is being played. What happens if we try to for-
mulate Newcomb’s question to explicitly incorporate this lack of specificity? In
4In Realist’s Bayes net, given the associated restricted possible form of P(y | g), there is
no edge connecting the node for g with the node for y. This means that g and y are ‘causally
independent’, to use the language of causal nets [18]. This causal relationship is consistent with
the single-stage game in Table 1, in contrast to the causal relationship of the game played under
Fearful’s interpretation, which requires a two-stage game.
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other words, what happens if we try to merge the game that Fearful thinks is being
played with the game that Realist thinks is being played?
Such a merging gives us an ‘extended game’ of the sort considered in [17],
involving two Bayes net games. The Bayes nets of those two games are the two
Bayes nets discussed in the preceding subsections. The strategy space of W for
the extended game is the set of all pairs of a conditional distribution P(g | y) for
the first (Fearful) Bayes net and a distribution P(g) for the second (Realist) Bayes
net. Your strategy space is the set of all pairs of a P(y) for the first Bayes net, and
a distribution h(y) for the second Bayes net.
We will now show that there are several ways that this extended game can
result in a joint distribution of the Fearful Bayes net game that contradicts the joint
distribution of the Realist Bayes net game. Each of these ways that a contradiction
can arise means that to make Newcomb’s question fully formal, we cannot merge
the Bayes net games; to avoid the possibility of a contradiction we must specify
one or the other of the two games.
First, we will show that if W sets P(g | y) for Fearful’s Bayes net appropriately,
then some of your strategies h(y) for Realist’s Bayes net become impossible. In
other words, for those strategy choices by W and by you, the joint distribution over
the game variables for Realists’s Bayes net contradicts the joint distribution over
the game variables for Fearful’s Bayes net. (This is true for almost any P(g | y)
that W might choose, and in particular is true even if W does not predict perfectly.)
To begin, pick any α ∈ (1/2, 1], and presume that P(g | y) is set by W to be
αδg,y + (1 − α)(1 − δg,y) (for all y such that P(y) , 0). So for example, under
Fearful’s interpretation, where W uses a perfectly error-free prediction algorithm,
α = 1. Given this presumption, the only way that P(y | g) can be g-independent
(for all g such that P(g) , 0) is if it is one of the two delta functions, δy,AB or δy,B.
(See the appendix for a formal proof.) This contradicts Realist’s interpretation of
the game, under which you can set P(y | g) to any h(y) you desire.5
Similarly, if P(g | y) is set by W to be δg,y for all y such that P(y) , 0, as under
Fearful’s presumption, then your (Realist) choice of h affects P(g). In fact, your
choice of h fully specifies P(g).6 This contradicts Realist’s presumption that it is
W’s strategy that sets P(g), independent of you.
Conversely, if you can set P(y | g) to be an arbitrary g-independent distribution
5Note that of the two δ functions you can choose in this combined decomposition, it is better
for you to choose h(y) = δy,B, resulting in a payoff of 1, 000, 000. So your optimal response to
Newcomb’s question for this variant is the same as if you were Fearful.
6For example, make Fearful’s presumption be that P(g | y) = δg,y for all y such that P(y) , 0.
Given this, if you set h(y) = δy,AB, then P(g) = δg,AB, and if you set h(y) = δy,B, then P(g) = δg,B.
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(as Realist presumes), then what you set it to may affect P(g | y) (in violation of
Fearful’s presumption that P(g | y) is set exclusively by W). In other words, if your
having ‘free will’ means what it does to Realist, then you have the power to change
the prediction accuracy of W (!). As an example, if you set P(y = AB | g) = 3/4
for all g’s such that P(g) , 0, then P(g | y) cannot equal δg,y.
The resolution of Newcomb’s paradox is now immediate: You can be free to
set P(y) however you want, with P(g | y) set by W, as Fearful presumes, or, as
Realist presumes, you can be free to set P(y | g) to whatever distribution h(y) you
want, with P(g) set by W. It is not possible to play both games simultaneously.7
2.4 Discussion
It is important to emphasize that the impossibility of playing both games simul-
taneously arises for almost any error rate α in the P(g | y) chosen by W, i.e., no
matter how accurately W predicts. This means that the stipulation in Newcomb’s
paradox that W predicts perfectly is a red herring. (Interestingly, Newcomb him-
self did not insist on such perfect prediction in his formulation of the paradox,
perhaps to avoid the time paradox problems.) The crucial impossibility implicit
in Newcomb’s question is the idea that at the same time you can arbitrarily spec-
ify ‘your’ distribution P(y | g) and W can arbitrarily specify ‘his” distribution
P(g | y). In fact, neither of you two can set your distribution without possibly
affecting the other’s distribution; you and W are inextricably coupled.
We also emphasize that vague concepts (e.g., ‘free will’) or controversial ones
(e.g., ‘causality’) are not relevant to the resolution of Newcomb’s paradox; it is not
necessary to introduce mathematizations of those concepts to resolve Newcomb’s
paradox. The only mathematics needed is standard probability theory, together
with the axioms of VonNeumann Morgenstern utility theory.
Another important contribution of our resolution is that it shows that New-
comb’s scenario does not establish a conflict between game theory’s dominance
principle and its expected utility principle, as some have suggested. Indeed, as
7In a variant of Newcomb’s question, you first choose one of these two presumptions, and then
set the associated distribution. If the pre-fixed distribution P(g | y) arising in the first presumption
is δg,y, then your optimal responses depend on the pre-fixed distribution P(g) arising in the second
presumption— a distribution that is not specified in Newcomb’s question. If P(g) obeys P(g =
B) > .999, then your optimal pair of choices are first to choose to set the distribution P(y | g) to
some h(y), and then to set h(y) = δy,AB. If this condition is not met, you should first choose to set
P(y), and then set it to δy,AB.
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mentioned, we adopt the standard expected utility axioms of game theory through-
out our analysis. However nowhere do we violate the dominance principle.
The key behind our avoiding a conflict between those two principles is our
taking care to specify what Bayes net underlies the game. Realist’s reasoning ap-
pears to follow the dominance principle, and Fearful’s to follow the principle of
maximizing expected utility. (Hence the conflicting answers of Realist and Fear-
ful appear to illustrate a conflict between those two principles.) However Realist
is actually following the principle of maximizing expected utility for that Bayes
net game for which Realist’s answer is correct. In contrast, Realist’s reasoning is
an unjustified violation of that principle for the Bayes net game in which Realist’s
answer is incorrect. (In particular, Realist’s answer does not follow from the dom-
inance principle in that Bayes net game.) It is only by being sloppy in specifying
the underlying Bayes net game that it appears that there is a conflict between the
expected utility principle and the dominance principle.
Note also that no time variable occurs in our analysis of Newcomb’s paradox.
Concretely, nothing in our analysis using Bayes nets and associated games re-
quires that W’s prediction occur before your choice. This lack of a time variable
in our analysis means we can assign times to the events in our analysis any way
we please, and the analysis still holds; the analysis is time-reversal invariant.
This invariance helps clarify the differences in the assumptions made by Real-
ist and Fearful. The invariance means that both the formal statement of the para-
dox and its resolution are unchanged if the prediction occurs after your choice
rather than (as is conventional) before your choice. In other words, W could use
data accumulated up to a time after you make your choice to ‘retroactively predict’
what your choice was. In the extreme case, the ‘prediction’ algorithm could even
directly observe your choice. All of the mathematics introduced above concerning
Bayes nets, and possible contradictions still holds.
In particular, in this time-reversed version of Newcomb’s scenario, Fearful
would be concerned that W can observe his choice with high accuracy. (That’s
what it means to have P(g | y) be a delta function whose argument is set by
the value of y.) Formally, this is exactly the same as the concern of Fearful in
the conventional Newcomb’s scenario that W can predict his choice with high
accuracy.
In contrast, in the time-reversed version of Newcomb’s scenario, Realist would
believe that he can guarantee that his choice is independent of what W says he
chooses. (That’s what it means to have P(y | g) equal some h(y), independent of g.)
In essence, he assumes that you can completely hide your choice from W, so that
W can only guess randomly what choice you made. Formally, this assumption is
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exactly the same as the ‘free will’ belief of Realist in the conventional Newcomb’s
scenario that you can force W’s prediction to be independent of your choice.
In this time-reversed version of Newcomb’s scenario, the differences between
the assumptions of Realist and Fearful are far starker than in the conventional form
of Newcomb’s scenario, as is the fact that those assumptions are inconsistent.
One could use this time-reversed version to try to argue in favor of one set of
assumptions or the other (i.e., argue in favor of one Bayes net game or the other).
Our intent instead is to clarify that Newcomb’s question does not specify which
Bayes net game is played, and therefore is not properly posed. As soon as one
or the other of the Bayes net games is specified, then Newcomb’s question has a
unique, correct answer.
3 Conclusion
Newcomb’s paradox has been so vexing that it has led some to resort to non-
Bayesian probability theory in their attempt to understand it [22, 8], some to pre-
sume that payoff must somehow depend on your beliefs as well as what’s under
the boxes [11], and has even even led some to claim that quantum mechanics is
crucial to understanding the paradox [13]. This is all in addition to work on the
paradox based on now-discredited formulations of causality [7].
Our analysis shows that the resolution of Newcomb’s paradox is in fact quite
simple. Newcomb’s paradox takes two incompatible interpretations of a question,
with two different answers, and makes it seem as though they are the same inter-
pretation. The lesson of Newcomb’s paradox is just the ancient verity that one
must carefully define all one’s terms.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank Mark Wilber and Charlie Strauss for
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Choose AB Choose B
Predict AB: 1000 0
Predict B: 1, 001, 000 1, 000, 000
Table 1: The payoff to you for the four combinations of your choice and W’s
prediction.
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APPENDIX
In the text, it is claimed that if for some α ∈ (1/2, 1], W can ensure that P(g | y) =
αδg,y + (1 − α)(1 − δg,y) for all y such that P(y) , 0, and if in addition P(y | g)
is g-independent for all g such that P(g) , 0, then in fact P(y | g) is one of the
two delta functions, δy,AB or δy,B. This can be seen just by examining the general
2 × 2 table of values of P(g, y) that is consistent with the first hypothesis, that
P(g | y) = αδg,y + (1 − α)(1 − δg,y):
y = AB y = B
g = AB: αzAB (1 − α)zB
g = B: (1 − α)zAB αzB
Table 2: The probabilities of the four combinations of your choice y and W’s
prediction g, given that P(g | y) = αδg,y + (1 − α)(1 − δg,y) for all y with non-zero
P(y). Both zAB and zB are in [0, 1], and normalization means that zAB + zB = 1.
If both zAB , 0 and zB , 0, then neither P(g = AB) nor P(g = B) equals zero.
Under such a condition, the second hypothesis, that P(y | g) is g-independent for
all g such that P(g) , 0, would mean that P(y | g) is the same function of y for
both g’s. This in turn means that
αzAB
(1 − α)zB =
(1 − α)zAB
αzB
(3)
which is impossible given our bounds on α. Accordingly, either zAB or zB equals
zero. QED
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